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 The Culture of Technology
 of Singapore
 Alwyn Lim
 Department of Sociology
 National University of Singapore
 The objective of this paper is to map the sociological context in which the
 cultural economy of technology of Singapore exists. Taking a socio-histori
 cal perspective, this paper argues that the development of Singapore as a
 technological 'intelligent island' must take centre stage in relation to the soci
 ological analysis of modern Singapore's political, economic, and socio-cultural
 structure. This involves a critique of theories of the information society and
 empirical research on East Asian developmental states. The aim is to chart
 the development of technology in Singapore, from its founding as a colonial
 port-city to its current status as an 'intelligent island', and to situate this
 development in its social context. In addressing the issue of the global expan
 sion of localized technological knowledge hubs, I argue that while these
 technological 'hubs' are increasingly linked in complex political, economic
 and social networks, one must also account for the developmental trajectory
 of each particular 'hub' and to explain the socio-cultural complex of societies,
 which promote themselves as such. This paper intends to demonstrate how
 this construction of a technological nation state is neither a context-free pro
 ject nor one that is free of complex historical antagonisms and contradictions.
 Introduction
 The impact of information technology on society has been the focus of
 current academic inquiry into science, technology, and society. Certainly,
 as Manuel Castells points out in his three-volume The Information Age (1997;
 2000a; 2000b), this change has been both intensive as well as extensive.
 That is to say, this radical transformation of society necessarily takes place
 at both global and local levels. Together with Castells' Rise of the Network
 Society (2000a), such studies as David Lyon's The Information Society (1988),
 and Andrew Webster's Science, Technology, and Society (1991) have brought
 the question of the relationship between technology, society, economy, and
 culture to the forefront of sociological inquiry.
 The Information Society?
 The validity of the notion of the 'information society' has been put forward
 by several different conceptions of what such a society might constitute. I
 intend to argue that given the processes of increasing globalization and the
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 rapid increase in the convergences of computer technologies and mobile
 communications, we are witnessing the development of specific technological
 hubs that are linked across space in complex political, social, and economic
 networks. These networks constitute technological activity that spans any
 thing from production to dissemination, and to research and development.
 This much is the object of inquiry of studies such as Castells' The Informational
 City (1989) and Castells and Peter Hall's Technopoles of the World (1994).
 While authors like Castells and Hall concentrate on the development
 of technoscience parks, and research and development institutions, I argue
 that it is also important to study the entire cultural complex of societies
 that promote themselves as such technological hubs. That is to say, the
 study of the constitution and construction of 'informational societies' can
 not be undertaken using empty tropes such as 'knowledge' or 'technology'
 without considering the unique developmental trajectories of each specific
 technological society. As the development processes of the construction of
 these various 'technopoles' depend on different historical circumstances and
 contingencies, a socio-historical approach is necessary to determine the very
 social and cultural conditions of the existence of such 'technopoles'. Although
 reflecting different conceptual concerns, prime examples of such an approach
 include studies by Merton (1970) and Baber (1996).
 Castells admits as much when he considers the East Asian experience
 of industrialization, and how developmental states appropriate technology
 in attempting to assimilate themselves into the network enterprise (2000a: 197
 199). He argues that the "historical expression of this societal project [of
 transforming social order] took the form of the affirmation of national iden
 tity, and national culture, building or rebuilding the nation as a force in
 the world, in this case by means of economic competitiveness and socio
 economic improvement" (2000a: 198). In his study on space and technol
 ogy — part of his cornerstone theory on the constitution and reproduc
 tion of modern social reality — he argues that "the Information Age is
 ushering in a new urban form, the informational city" and "in spite of the
 extraordinary diversity of cultural and physical contexts there are some
 fundamental common features in the trans-cultural development of the
 informational city" (2000a:429). Nevertheless, despite Castells' acknowl
 edgement, I in this paper, to demonstrate the importance of a sociologi
 cal inquiry into the particular development of such an informational soci
 ety, i.e. Singapore, and to explore the unique and specific socio-historical
 condition on which such a development has been possible.
 The 'Intelligent Island' Today
 To write a history of the development of Singapore is also to write a his
 tory of technology in Singapore. Several simple statistics allude to the ubiq
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 uity of (new) technologies in Singapore society. Over a short period of five
 years, for example, dial-up Internet subscriptions have risen phenomenally
 from 2,000 in 1994 to 583,000 in 1999 (Department of Statistics, 2000:157).
 Likewise, the Singapore government's operating expenditure on communi
 cations and information technology has increased more than tenfold, from
 S$4.1 million in 1989 to a massive S$458 million in 1999 (ibid.: 194).
 Another expression of this fact is the increase in enrolment of polytechnic
 students in information technology courses, from 2,410 students in 1994
 to 6,397 students in 1999 (ibid.:231).
 A recent survey of electronic commerce in Singapore revealed that of
 the top 1,000 enterprises in Singapore, 91 per cent have access to the
 Internet and 45 per cent have their own corporate websites. Revenues
 derived from electronic commerce supporting services increased from S$ 144
 million in 1997 to a massive S$256 million in 1998. Total business-to-busi
 ness (B2B) electronic commerce sales had increased significandy from SSI97
 million in 1997 to a staggering S$1.2 billion in 1998.
 June 1998 saw the commercial launch of Singapore ONE, a national
 initiative to deliver a new level of interactive, multimedia applications and
 services to homes, businesses and schools throughout Singapore. It is one
 of the first few implementations of multimedia broadband networks and
 applications in the world that promises to encompass such scope and depth,
 followed by a complete liberalization of the telecommunications market in
 January 2000. A recent household survey (1999) conducted by the National
 Computer Board showed that there was a great deployment of informa
 tion technology in Singaporean households, with home computer owner
 ship and home Internet penetration rising to 59 per cent and 42 per cent,
 respectively — figures that look set to rise further. The survey also indi
 cated that the general trend towards having more than one computer at
 home was at 16 per cent (representing an increase of more than 10 per
 cent since 1990).
 These various figures should be seen in the fight of developments in
 new technology policies that have been elaborated on throughout the years
 of Singapore's independence — Science and Technology for 2 Million (Ministry
 of Science and Technology, 1975), National IT Plan (National IT Working
 Committee, 1985), A Vision of an Intelligent Island (National Computer Board,
 1992), the National Science and Technology Plan: Securing our future
 (National Science and Technology Board, 1997), and IDA 2000: Bringing
 Singapore to the World (Infocomm Development Authority, 2001).
 'Information technology', 'intelligent island', and 'knowledge-based
 economy' are just some of the common tropes (among a constant barrage
 of others) through which the image of Singapore/ans is expressed and rep
 resented. Huge financial investments, the significance of which is alluded
 to above, further pointto a significant material dimension that far tran
 scends the tropes and rhetoric employed in official government literature.
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 It would appear that the cultural economy of technology in Singapore has
 had deep effects, from the nation-level visions of a future Singapore down
 to the organization of the everyday lives of Singaporeans. To sociologically
 study this cultural economy of technology is, therefore, to attend to his
 torical sites of discourse, where statements on the status and development
 of technology in Singapore have been authoritatively produced, dissemi
 nated, and debated over.
 Colonial Science and Technology
 Historically, it is almost a truism that under British colonial rule, Singapore
 was founded, developed, and maintained in the 19th and 20th centuries
 stricdy as a port-city (Turnbull, 1989; Wright and Cartwright, 1989; Pearson,
 1956; Makepeace et al., 1991). Founded by Stamford Raffles in 1819 under
 the auspices of the British East India Company, it is in fact impossible to
 examine colonial Singapore without situating her within the context of
 Western imperialist interests. There are very few sources that explicitly
 detail the development of science and technology during Singapore's colo
 nial period. Any historical information must, therefore, be reconstructed
 from the various historical texts, documents and journals that commented
 on British rule in Singapore. With limited urban development to facilitate
 the colonial administration, Singapore — as a Far Eastern colony — played
 a significant economic role for Britain's colonial network. It served both
 as a port-of-call for trade as well as a communications outpost that sup
 ported Britain's colonial economic system (Goh, 1995:24; Headrick, 1981,
 1988). The potential for financial gain had attracted regional traders and
 labourers whose sole aim was economic profit.
 Technological transfer from the British colonial administrators, and
 industrial/manufacturing know-how was scarce except, perhaps, for the
 construction and maintenance of physical infrastructure; for example, port
 facilities and warehouses to facilitate efficient trading and goods storage,
 and bridges and roads to facilitate easy transportation and linkages to other
 built-up sectors of the island. Significant events during this period include
 the developments in shipping technologies (e.g. shipbuilding and engineer
 ing facilities) and the laying of submarine cables that linked Singapore to
 a larger colonial network via the telegraph.
 Advancements in marine technology, in the form of improved ship
 building, were the most explicit forms of technology that directly concerned
 the port status of colonial Singapore (Headrick, 1988:259). The conse
 quence of these developments was a change in the physical landscape of
 Singapore, as wharf and dock facilities were constructed to facilitate trade
 as well as serve as a coaling station for British traders (Goh, 1995:30-1;
 Cameron, 1965:35; Bogaars, 1956; Gibson-Hill, 1956). By the end of the
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 19th century, the port of Singapore had already undergone significant struc
 tural changes to accommodate the increase in shipping and trade. Further,
 the advent of telegraph communications technology was to have implica
 tions on Singapore's role in the British Empire. The British Colonial Defence
 Committee certainly believed that:
 The maintenance of submarine cable communications throughout the world
 in time of war is of the highest importance to the strategic and commer
 cial interests of every portion of the British Empire (Kennedy, 1971:729).
 As early as 1859, Singapore was linked via submarine cable to Batavia,
 even though the technology was at an experimental stage and failed on
 several occasions (Goh, 1995:39). However, improvements in cable tech
 nology meant that Singapore was connected to the world via telegraph by
 1882 (ibid.:40). This was instrumental in Singapore's playing a strategic
 role in the defence telegraph networks of the British Empire in the relay
 ing of messages, while serving the needs of traders and the business com
 munity (Kennedy, 1971:730-1). Of course, the impact of rapid commer
 cial growth as a result of these technological advancements meant an
 improvement in colonial Singapore's urban infrastructure. Urban planning
 was initiated in an attempt to systematize the colony, while modern modes
 of transportation and electricity were introduced but only to the benefit of
 the business and colonial communities (Goh, 1995:65).
 Education in colonial Singapore was a haphazard affair largely due
 to the colonial government's view of Singapore as a trading port-city within
 the imperial trading network. This had an adverse effect on the upgrad
 ing of English and technical education in Singapore from 1900 to 1940.
 Industrial and technical education was administered with reluctance, with
 higher technical education rejected by an education committee convened
 in 1925 (Wong and Gwee, 1980:93). Surveys conducted by this very same
 committee revealed that science-related education and technical skills upgrad
 ing were not popular. In fact, pioneering science night classes at the Raffles
 Institutionbetween 1922 and 1923 could only boast a maximum of 15 stu
 dents each (ibid.:95). Established educational institutions concentrated on
 providing administrative skills to staff a civil service in supporting the trad
 ing economy,with science-related and technical education being unpopular
 and deemed unpractical. Educational progress seemed to depend on the
 needs of British colonial administrators instead of the need to develop any
 long-term educational system for the local population (Goh, 1995:111),
 The lack of technology transfer from Great Britain to colonial Singapore,
 whether in terms of hardware, skillsor knowledge, basically affirms that
 Singapore's position within Britain's colonial empire was merely as a trad
 ing city and an outpost in the Far East. While provisions were made for
 building physical infrastructure as well as overseeing the development of a
 modern city, education policies were haphazardly implemented, leaving
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 vernacular schools to the respective ethnic communities. Science and tech
 nical education were limited and considered unnecessary by the colonial
 administration. Basically, the British colonial government had only con
 centrated on the development of Singapore as a trading outpost; a site of
 commerce rather than an area with the potential for industrialization.
 Establishing an Industrial Economy
 In the aftermath of World War II and the Japanese Occupation, Singapore's
 independence from Malaysia in 1965 signalled the start of doubt about its
 viability as an independent economic entity. With Singapore's indepen
 dence, the ruling People's Action Party (PAP) attempted in the 1960s and
 1970s to rapidly push for policies to establish an industrial base that the
 British colonial government had clearly failed to develop. In terms of eco
 nomic strategies, this meant a focus on manufacturing industries, and an
 export-oriented industrialization plan (United Nations, 1963).
 Faced with the simultaneous problems of ensuring social and politi
 cal stability in a rapidly decolonizing Southeast Asian region, the Singapore
 government planned to integrate the country into an already global capi
 talist economy, while launching attempts to foster a national identity for
 a largely immigrant population. Couched in the political rhetoric of 'cri
 sis and survival', technology was seen as the key for leapfrogging the ini
 tial stages of industrialization already experienced by the advanced capi
 talist nations. These various strategies relied on the mobilization of the
 Singaporean population through several methods, including disciplining the
 labour force as well as through education in a highly centralized school
 system (Chua, 1995:59-60; Castells, 1992:35-37, 53; Wilson, 1978:235). In
 many ways, the foundation and economic survival of this new nation was
 explicitly connected to the personal responsibilities of each citizen in fulfilling
 his or her role in these systems of correct training. Contrary to popular
 opinion at that time, a United Nations Industrial Survey Report (United
 Nations, 1963) stated that Singapore could, in fact, be viable as an inde
 pendent economic entity. It seemed that the key to political and economic
 survival lay in industrialization and labour discipline, rather than Asian
 values: 'The gist of the Singapore solution was plain and straightforward —
 Industrialise or Bust (Devan-Nair, 1973:65)!'
 The immediate concerns for stability 'survival' inadvertently estab
 lished the ruling party's reactive orientation for the next 35 years (Chua,
 1995:48-50 and Chan, 1971:32). Occupied with problems of providing
 employment and improving the living standards of the Singaporean pop
 ulation, it paid little attention to establishing or developing indigenous
 scientific/technological capabilities despite the recommendations of the ad
 hoc advisory committee to the government on science and technology (in
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 1966, the Singapore Science Council in 1967, and a Ministry of Science
 and Technology in 1968 (cf. Ministry of Culture, 1969). This saw the devel
 opment of a governmental directive to attract foreign multinational cor
 porations as a catalyst for technological leapfrogging (United Nations,
 1963:74). A similar attempt was made to engage foreign management per
 sonnel, engineers and technicians (Goh, 1972:279). Litde attention was
 given to research and development as the local government aimed towards
 fulfilling the more 'pressing' issues of securing a stable and disciplined
 labour force and establishing Singapore as an international production base,
 so that as it could then take advantage of its competitive labour costs.
 Following a somewhat conventional developmental model, a sophisti
 cation and broadening of the industrial base followed (1974-78). This
 demonstrated that the ruling government took no chances in securing its
 growing position in the global economy, despite rising local labour costs
 (Murray and Perera 1995:25). This advance is congruent with what has
 been put forward as the 'developmental state' thesis (Johnson, 1995; Castells,
 1992:56). The societal project of modernization, as undertaken by the
 Singapore government in this case, is also at once the construction and
 assertion of national identity, a Singaporean modernity, through economic
 success and socio-economic progress.
 However, this anticipated certain core problems that affected the dissem
 ination of technological skills and knowledge. One main problem was that
 there was difficulty in enhancing the status of technical education as it was
 associated with blue-collar work, a condition previously noted in France
 and Japan (Bourdieu, 1998:29). There was concern that this would affect
 the supply of a pool of skilled workers required to facilitate the industri
 alization process. Until recent years, the transfer and diffusion of technol
 ogy and skills from multinational corporations to local workers had been
 scarce (Goh, 1995:162) with local workers acting merely as facilitators of
 foreign technologies. Although the industrialization programme and the
 manufacturing industry were successful in alleviating the problem of mass
 unemployment, industrial firms in Singapore were largely "abour-intensive,
 low wage and low-productivity enterprises, requiring the mere repetition
 of simple operations along the assembly and production lines" (Goh,
 1995:166). The initial stages of industrialization lacked a clear science and
 technology policy. The Ministry of Science and Technology, established in
 1968, was to have an ambiguous role in promoting science and technol
 ogy, and folded little more than 10 years after its inception.
 With independence in 1965, the Singapore government's urgency to
 leapfrog technologically resulted in many contradictory policies and out
 comes. Being dependent on foreign multinational corporations, its objec
 tive of developing an indigenous technological base was very much in
 conflict with the fact that technological development was tied to foreign
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 technology, hardware, and skills. With policies aimed specifically at making
 technological research and development economically profitable, there is still
 controversy over whether scientific/technological research should be adopted
 for its own sake. This tension between fundamental and applied research
 in the context of the government-university-industry linkage is a growing
 global concern and is suitably expressed by Etzkowitz (1996, 1997). This
 has led some authors to believe that it is the explicit economic motive that
 is inhibiting the development of an indigenous and autonomous techno
 logical base in Singapore (see e.g. Goh, 1995:297-324). The irony here is
 that in a drive to promote a technological rationality for Singapore society,
 the result is an economic 'rationality' that restrains technological innovation.
 En Route to the 'Intelligent Island'
 A restructuring of the Singapore economy took place between 1979 and
 1984, with an explicit emphasis on higher value-added industries and ser
 vices. This move had, in fact, succeeded in achieving some of the gov
 ernment's goals, including rapid growth between 1980 and 1984 — much
 higher than in other Asian New Industrializing Economies. However, the
 severe recession of 1985 to 1986 led to the convening of a special high
 level economic committee, and new directions for the economy were charted.
 It is significant that two of the new growth areas identified were the high
 tech industry and information technology. This urgency was captured with
 the publication of the National IT Plan (National IT Plan Working Com
 mittee, 1985) which unreservedly stated that:
 • Companies in both manufacturing and services must fully exploit
 the advances in IT [information technology] to gain a competitive
 edge.
 • It is not enough just to computerize. To be able to compete bet
 ter, our industries need strategic and creative exploitation of IT.
 • Singapore should exploit the opportunities of IT as a new growth
 industry.
 • A consolidated national IT strategy should be implemented, to be
 spearheaded by NCB [National Computer Board], subsuming the
 present national computerization effort. (National IT Plan Working
 Committee, 1985:i)
 Despite the fact that manufacturing and other industries are still a
 large part of economic development in Singapore, the specific focus and
 the rhetoric employed suggests that embracing new technologies would be
 the key to Singapore's economic survival and social stability.
 The development of a technological trajectory in the 1980s would see
 a 'second industrial revolution', with foreign technology and corporations
 playing a central role in economic development (Mirza, 1986). In the early
This content downloaded from 202.161.43.77 on Fri, 05 Jan 2018 13:38:57 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 The Culture of Technology of Singapore • 279
 half of the 1980s, the Singapore government required foreign and local
 investors to upgrade speedily from labour-intensive operations to capital
 intensive and high-technology operations. The government's explicit endorse
 ment and reliance on foreign multinational corporations to spearhead
 Singapore's drive towards a high-technology future is an affirmation of a
 new economy — one that is informational, networked, and potentially
 global (cf. Castells' definition, 2000a:77). In 1986, backed by ministerial
 promotion missions to major foreign investor countries as well as adver
 tisements in international publications, the Economic Development Board
 embarked on an aggressive campaign to attract new investments with high
 technical content.
 However, Singapore's high reliance on foreign technology and capi
 tal investment at this stage of development has led some scholars to dis
 pute Singapore's status as 'newly-industrialized' or as having had an 'indus
 trial revolution' at all (Yoshihara, 1988). Yoshihara's controversial thesis
 was that Singapore, one of the so-called 'newly-industrialized' Southeast
 Asian states, did not have any indigenous techno-scientific base and was
 instead relying heavily on its service industry and foreign technology and
 skills. Doubts had also been cast over whether this influx of foreign tech
 nology and highly-skilled management had resulted in any significant trans
 fer of skills or knowledge (Lim, 1978; Chng et al., 1986:40,78), or even
 any beneficial research and development linkages.
 Nevertheless, in developing a science and technology framework in
 the 1980s, the determined economic objective was to create employment
 for 'national survival' and sustainable development, essentially through
 attracting foreign investments. Three interrelated issues were given prior
 ity: (i) that research and development in Singapore should be 'market
 pulled' instead of 'science-pushed', (ii) that the country should hope to
 achieve technological self-reliance through, amongst other measures, appro
 priate alterations in the education system, and (iii) that high-technology
 foreign investors were seen as indispensable channels to transfer and diffuse
 technology and skills (Goh, 1995:222). The Strategic Economic Plan had
 even stressed the need for 'innovation', and that 'major progress needs to
 be made here in the next phase of economic development' (Ministry of
 Trade and Industry, 1991:28).
 The National Technology Plan of 1991, followed by 1992's A Vision of an
 Intelligent Island were meant to spell out the next technological trajectory;
 not only for the economy but for the general Singapore society as well,
 in transforming Singapore into an 'intelligent island'. The 'intelligent island'
 would be the central motif and objective in Singapore's development, por
 trayed in the popular media by various new technological innovations such
 as EduNet, TradeNet, Electronic Road Pricing, smart cards, electronic
 funds transfer, etc. In fact.
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 To the extent that Singapore has become one of the most highly com
 puterized nations in the world, with a burgeoning IT industry and a track
 record of sophisticated, sometimes world-beating, IT applications in busi
 ness and government, Singapore's computer policy management may be
 judged a success (Choo, 1997:58).
 The construction of Singapore as an 'intelligent island' would also be
 akin to a nationalist project, since the exhortations of official government
 literature demands that embracing new technologies be both a personal as
 well as a national responsibility. A typical way of representing the situa
 tion would be:
 Despite the anticipated social problems, Singapore cannot avoid becoming
 an information society. The strategic position of Singapore as an interna
 tional telecommunication node, the openness of the economy to international
 influences, the desire for a higher standard of living and the push to be a
 brain centre blends well with the requirements of becoming an information
 society, the society of the future (National IT Committee, 1985:30).
 It is in instances like these that the technological project is offered up as
 a historical necessity, not only that (i) the transition to an 'intelligent island'
 is inevitable and essential but also that (ii) this fundamental shift is a transna
 tional one and potentially global in nature, and (iii) that this shift relies on
 a mode of economy that is largely determined by international flows of
 knowledge, skills, and technology.
 In a decisive move, the Infocomm Development Authority (IDA) was
 instituted in 1999 to punctuate the government's dedication at establish
 ing Singapore as a knowledge-based economy as well as a life sciences/
 biotechnology hub. In facing the 2001 recession, it might be suggested that
 the Singapore government is using its current technological focus as yet
 another instrument to legitimize and strengthen its political leadership.
 With Singapore in the 21st century, 'information technology', 'life sci
 ences' and 'innovation' have become catchphrases that have gained cul
 tural mileage in official speeches and statements, even though very few of
 these speeches are able to articulate exactly what it means to be 'innova
 tive' or 'creative', or exactly how new technologies are supposed to be
 appropriated and utilized. Given the current ongoing economic recession,
 the Singapore government's rarefied ideology of practical survival becomes
 more entrenched in an ad hoc contextual rationality where technology poli
 cies are concerned. Such reactive and contextual interventions by the gov
 ernment have been expressed by a smattering of policies that try to push
 for science and technology innovation in a confused array of new areas
 such as technopreneurship, information technology, communications tech
 nology, life sciences, stem cell research, etc. All of these still rely on a great
 degree of 'foreign talent' since, without an economic motive, little attempt
 has been made to encourage research and development.
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 The Logic of Singapore's Culture of Technology
 This socio-historical survey of Singapore's culture of technology indicates
 that the construction of a technological nation-state/'intelligent island' is
 much more complex than is usually portrayed in the popular media. The
 progression of Singapore from a colonial port-city to an intelligent island
 is certainly not of a linear development. It involves constant negotiation
 between social, education, economic, industrial, and technological policies
 that are constantly being revised in light of the ephemeral nature of the
 global capitalist economy. In the attempt to map the history of Singapore's
 culture of technology, I find it important to emphasize historical continu
 ities and discontinuities, for example, in the convergence of the discourses
 of technological progress and the attempt at making technological devel
 opment a nationalist project.
 From some of the tentative conclusions I have drawn, I attempt to
 identify the working logic by which we might identify Singapore's condi
 tions of existence as an 'intelligent island' today. This basically consists of
 a matrix of four interrelated discourses that underpin the development of
 Singapore's culture of technology.
 • The relationship between postcoloniality and globalization;
 • Nation-building and the problem of national identity;
 • The rhetoric of 'survival' within the narratives of crisis and Utopia;
 • Technocapitalism and the notion of modernity.
 When the obsession with technology is seen in light of these discourses,
 it is these four concerns that identify why and how technology is to be
 discoursed in Singapore today. Coupled with the developmental state the
 sis, it identifies how Singapore attempts to integrate itself into the global,
 networked informational economy (Castells, 2000a:77-147).
 Tentatively, we might identify the conditions of existence of Singapore's
 culture of technology not as a response to modernization and societal ratio
 nalization, but as an expression of that very condition of modernity. Achieving
 independence in an already globalizing world economy and in a rapidly
 decolonizing region, the problem of nation-building and forging a national
 identity — and the integration of these economies into the global capital
 ist formation — was, and still is, a significant project for the Singapore
 government and Singaporeans as well. Independence in 1965 had, after
 all, meant that Singapore had to be politically and economically viable in
 an already globalized economic network led by the advanced industrial
 ized nation-states.
 While it might seem that new technologies have by now been read
 ily embraced by the better part of the Singaporean populace, it would be
 erroneous to view this situation as the result of a unilateral state decisions
 to impose the use of new technologies on Singaporeans. Instead, it might
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 be suggested that this culture of technology is built on everyday practices
 that are already taking place, despite them being disparate and uncoordi
 nated. The need for integrated government IT strategies is an attempt to
 bring these practices in line with state aims and objectives. Therefore what
 is needed is:
 (a) very positive attitude towards IT, fully appreciative of its potentials and
 the adjustments that will have to be brought about with its extensive use.
 Our IT vision will not be achievable if we do not bring about the neces
 sary attitudinal change among our citizens (National IT Working Committee,
 1985:48).
 Consequently, this mode of inducing 'attitudinal change' has, as its objec
 tive, the institution of self-regulating practices on the Singaporean indi
 vidual with regard to embracing new technologies, upgrading skills, mak
 ing technology a personal responsibility, etc. When the 'globalizing world'
 is depicted as one in which intensified connectivities and instantaneous
 transborder transactions constitute massive uncertainty (Du Gay, 1996), the
 embracing of new technologies in this global context is offered as a solu
 tion to the challenges shored up by global forces. As Lee Kuan-Yew him
 self reiterated:
 The environment is different, our neighbours are different, the world is
 different, the technology, the challenge is different. And it's easier in some
 ways because there are more resources, but in some ways it is more difficult
 because you need more high-calibre manpower to run this economy (Straits
 Times, 13 December 1999).
 There has been much commentary on the 'crisis and survival' narratives
 used by the state in interpreting the history of Singapore (Chan, 1971';
 Lau, 1992; Chua, 1995). However, what is not explicit is the flipside of
 that narrative — Utopia. For Mannheim, Utopia is that set of ideas that
 'transcends the present and is oriented toward the future' (1936:97). The
 promise of technological development is certainly one of the most significant
 tools used to construct a representation of a future technological utopia in
 line with Singapore's 'core beliefs and values'). The narratives of crisis and
 survival cannot be delinked from the accompanying narratives of Utopia.
 The official government literature and media reports on technologi
 cal development in Singapore establish that the use and exploitation of
 information-communications technology is necessary for its survival, future,
 processes of nation building and definition of a national identity. Given its
 precarious economic situation with independence, 'technology' is often used
 as a signifier in a historical tension between crisis and Utopia. That is to
 say, technological development is seen both as a method to transcend
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 Singapore's physical smallness and lack of exploitable natural resources, as
 well as a vision of a future technological Utopia. For example, the National
 IT Plan exhorts:
 The impact of IT will be all pervasive with significant social and cultural
 changes taking place in Singapore's society ... in the office environment. . .
 in factories ... in the service industry ... in personal services... in the home
 of the future (National IT Committee 1985:v).
 Contra-strategies to anchor national identity in a common 'past', discourses
 on technological progress and development appropriate such far-reaching
 and comprehensive Utopian visions so as to invest national identity in a
 future Singapore.
 Indeed, with meritocracy as one 'founding myth', Singapore's leaders
 "have to look towards the future and the importance of economic achieve
 ments to articulate their conception of the nation" (Hill and Lian, 1995:31).
 Faced with the task of abandoning colonial identities and establishing viable
 alternatives in Singapore's formative years, the PAP government had to
 resort to a careful politics of identity, given the geopolitical contingencies
 at the time. By the late 1990s and early 21st century, expressions of these
 visions of Utopia became commonplace in Singapore's popular media.
 These expressions came in the form of community songs, government
 advertisements, glossy brochures, etc., all of which promote the idea of a
 Utopia through an embracement of technological progress (Iim, 2000).
 The notion of progress is a deeply rooted and problematic social con
 dition especially for the so-called developmental states of Southeast Asia.
 The incessant drive for newness and innovation — a forward-looking and
 destructive impulse — had once been described by Berman (1988) as the
 'experience of modernity'. This notion of progress is certainly associated
 with the belief that technological progress can help define a Singaporean
 modernity and a unique national identity by helping to carve a niche in
 the global economy.
 Conclusion
 'Technology' and 'technological development' play an important role in
 the justification and legitimation of political, economic, and social practices
 in Singapore. This works through the rhetoric of 'survival', especially through
 the deployment of narratives of crisis and Utopia that stress the notion of
 the smallness and vulnerability of Singapore. Because 'technology' is seen
 as the key to economic survival and social stability, a form of technocap
 italism is embraced as the means to constructing a Singaporean moder
 nity. However, conflicting ideals and goals that evolve as a result of this
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 very modernity mean that government policies and social practices involv
 ing technology can only revolve around reactionary responses to the fleeting
 and ever-shifting global economy.
 Consequently, technology is a pertinent sociological issue in Singapore
 today. This paper has sought to demonstrate the social context within
 which technology is appropriated by mapping the social history of tech
 nology from Singapore's position as a colonial port-city to its current sta
 tus as an 'intelligent island', by arguing that the development and employ
 ment of technology in Singapore is neither an uncontested nor problem-free
 project. In doing so, I hope to have demonstrated why current studies on
 the information/network societies must account for the development of
 each specific culture of technology. These societal nodes in the global
 knowledge network should of course not be studied in isolation but in rela
 tion to the ongoing linkages between societies, which are a consequence
 of more intensive globalization processes.
 References
 Appelbaum, R. and J. Henderson eds.(1992) States and Development in the Asian Pacific
 Rim. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
 Baber, Z. (1996) The Science Of Empire: Scientific Knowledge, Civilisation, and Colonial Rule
 in India. Albany: SUNY Press.
 Ban, A. Pakir, and K.C. Tong eds. (1992) Imagining Singapore. Singapore: Times
 Academic Press.
 Berman, M. (1988) All That Is Solid Melts Into Air: The Experience of Modernity. London:
 Penguin.
 Boogars, G.E. (1956) "The Tanjong Pagar Dock Company, 1894-1905". Memoirs
 of the Raffles Museum, series 3. Singapore: GPO.
 Bourdieu, P. (1998) Practical Reason: On the Theory of Action. Cambridge: Polity.
 Cameron, J. (1965) Our Tropical Possession in Malayan India. KL: Oxford University
 Press.
 Castells, M. (1989) The Informational City: Information Technology, Economic Restructuring,
 and the Urban-Regional Crisis. Oxford: Blackwell.
 (1992) "Four Asian Tigers with a Dragon's Head: A Comparative Analysis
 of the State, Economy, and Society in the Asian Pacific Rim", in R. Appelbaum
 and J. Henderson eds., States and development in the Asian Pacific Rim. Newbury
 Park, CA:Sage, pp. 33-70.
 (1997) "The Power of Identity" (The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture
 Volume 2). Cambridge: Blackwell.
 (2000a) "Rise of the Network Society" (The Information Age: Economy, Society and
 Culture Volume 1). Cambridge: Blackwell.
 (2000b) "End of Millennium" (The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture
 Volume 3). Cambridge: Blackwell.
 Castells, M. and P. Hall (1994) Technopoles of the World: The Making of 21st Century
 Industrial Complexes. London: Routledge.
 Chan, H.C. (1971) Singapore: The Politics of Survival. Singapore: Oxford University Press.
This content downloaded from 202.161.43.77 on Fri, 05 Jan 2018 13:38:57 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 The Culture of Technology of Singapore • 285
 Chng, M.K., A. Tyabji, L. Low and B.N. Tay (1986) Effective Mechanisms for the
 Enhancement of Technology and Skills in Singapore. Singapre: ISEAS.
 Choo, C.W. (1997) "IT 2000: Singapore's Vision of an Intelligent Island", in
 P. Droege ed., Intelligent Environments: Spatial Aspects of the information revolution. New
 York: Elsevier, pp. 49-65.
 Chua, B.H. (1995) Communitarian Ideology And Democracy In Singapore. London: Routledge.
 Department of Statistics (2000) Yearbook of Statistics Singapore 2000. Singapore: Ministry
 of Trade and Industry.
 Devan-Nair, C.V. (1973) Toward Tomorrow: Essays on Development and Social Transformation
 in Singapore. Singapore: Singapore National Trade Union Congress.
 Droege, P. ed. (1997) Intelligent Environments: Spatial Aspects of the Information Revolution.
 New York: Elsevier.
 Du Gay, P. (1996) Consumption and Identity at Work. London: Sage.
 Etzkowitz, H. (1996) "Conflicts of Interest and Commitment in Academic Science
 in the United States", Minerva 34:259-277.
 (1997) "The Entrepreneurial University and the Emergence of Democratic
 Corporatism", in H. Etzkowitz and L. Leydesdorff eds., Universities and the Global
 Knowledge Economy: A Triple Helix of University-Industry-Govemment Relations. London:
 Pinter, pp. 141-152.
 Etzkowitz, H. and L. Leydesdorff eds. (1997) Universities and the Global Knowledge
 Economy: A Triple Helix of University-Industry-Govemment Relations. London: Pinter.
 Gibson-Hill, C.A. (1956) "Singapore Old Strait and New Harbour", Memoirs of
 Raffles Museum, series 3. Singapore: GPO.
 Goh, C.B. (1995) "The Role of State and Society in the Development of Science
 and Technology in Singapore". Ph.D. dissertation. Australia: University of New
 South Wales.
 Goh, K.S. (1972) The Economies of Modernisation and Other Essays. Singapore: Asia
 Pacific Press.
 Headrick, D.R. (1981) The Tools of Imperialism: Technology and European Imperialism in
 the 19th Century. New York: Oxford University Press.
 (1988) The Tentacles Of Progress: Technology in the Age of Imperialism 1850-1940.
 New York: Oxford University Press.
 Hill, M. and K.F. Lian (1995) The Politics of Nation-Building and Citizenship in Singapore.
 London: Routledge.
 Infocomm Development Authority (n.d.) Catalyst for Change. Singapore.
 (2001) IDA 2000: Bringing Singapore to the World. Singapore.
 Johnson, C. (1995) Japan: Who Governs? The Rise of the Developmental State. New York:
 W.W. Norton.
 Kennedy, P.M. (1971) "Imperial Cable Communications and Strategy 1879-1914",
 English Historical Review 86:728-752.
 Lau, A. (1992) "The National Past and the Writing of the History of Singapore",
 in K.C. Ban, A. Pakir, and K.C. Tong eds., Imagining Singapore. Singapore: Times
 Academic Press, p. 50.
 Lim, K. (2000) "Moments of magic." Performed and recorded by E. Lim, W. Fann
 and T. Chua. In Sing Singapore 2000 CD-ROM. Singapore: National Arts
 Council.
 lim, L.Y.C. (1978) Multinational Firms and Manufacturing for Export in Less Developed
 Countries. Ph.D. thesis Michigan Ann Arbor.
This content downloaded from 202.161.43.77 on Fri, 05 Jan 2018 13:38:57 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 286 • Alwyn Lim
 Lyon, D. (1988) The Information Society: Issues and Illusions. Cambridge: Polity Press.
 Makepeace, W.A., RJ. Braddell, and G.S. Brooke eds. (1991) One Hundred Tears of
 Singapore. Two volumes. Singapore: Oxford University Press.
 Mannheim, K. (1936) Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge.
 London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
 Merton, R.K. (1970) Science, Technology and Society in 17th Century England. New York:
 H. Fertig.
 Ministry of Culture (1969) Singapore Yearbook 1969. Singapore: Ministry of Culture,
 Information Division.
 Ministry of Trade and Industry (1991) The Strategic Economic Plan: Towards a Developed
 Nation. Singapore: SNP Publishers.
 Ministry of Science and Technology (1975) Science and Technology for 2 million.
 Singapore.
 Mirza, H. (1986) Multinationals and the Growth of the Singapore Economy. London:
 Croom Helm.
 Murray, G. and A. Perera (1995) Singapore: The Global city-state. Kent, UK: China
 Library.
 National Computer Board (1992) A Vision of an Intelligent Island. Singapore.
 National IT Working Committee (1985) National IT Plan. Singapore.
 National Science and Technology Board (1997) National Science and Technology Plan:
 Securing our Future. Singapore.
 Pearson, H.F. (1956) A History of Singapore. London: University of London.
 Straits Times (1999) "My son won't be another LKY, says SM". December 13.
 Turnbull, C.M. (1989) A History of Singapore: 1819-1988. Singapore: Oxford University
 Press.
 United Nations (1963) A Proposed Industrialisation Progamme for the State of Singapore.
 Singapore: U.N. Commissioner for Technical Assistance, Department of Economic
 and Social Affairs.
 Webster, A. (1991) Science, Technology, and Society: New Directions. London: Macmillan.
 Wilson, H.E. (1978) Social Engineering in Singapore. Singapore: Singapore University
 Press.
 Wong, F. and Y.H. Gwee (1980) Official Reports on Education: Straits Settlements and the
 Federated Malay States 1870-1939. Singapore: Pan Pacific Books.
 Wright, A. and H.A. Cartwright eds., Twentieth Century Impressions of British Malaya:
 Its History, People, Commerce, Industries and Resources. Singapore: Graham Brash.
 Yoshihara, K. (1988) The Rise of Ersatz Capitalism in Southeast Asia. New York: Oxford
 University Press.
This content downloaded from 202.161.43.77 on Fri, 05 Jan 2018 13:38:57 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
